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PRAYER IN PUBLIC SCHOOLSt
JOSEPH F. COSTANZO, S.J.*
T IS WELL AT THE OUTSET to define with precision the constitutional
issue involved in Engel v. Vitale.' The issue was not simply prayer
in public schools. No legal power can prevent a student from reciting
privately his prayers while sitting in the school library or standing in the
schoolyard provided he does not interfere with any academic assign-
ments or with prescribed recreational employments. All prayer is per-
sonal, all prayer is a religious exercise, wheresoever it is said, in private
or public institutions, and on every occasion. No description of prayer
as ceremonial deprives it of its religious nature and meaning. Only the
internal dispositions and, secondarily, the outward demeanor of a pri-
vate individual or of a public official, determine whether he is truly
praying or not. Prayer is always and on every occasion a religious exer-
cise or it is not prayer at all. A ceremonial prayer which is not a re-
ligious act is a contradiction in terms.
Prayer may be individual when one prays by himself or even in the
midst of others for his own intentions. And prayer may also be cor-
porate as when several pray together in unison for one another, or for
a purpose common to all of them. Corporate prayer may be at home as
when a family prays together, or in a house of worship when a congre-
gation professing the same creed takes part in a common liturgy. Cor-
porate prayer may also be civic as when fellow citizens voluntarily unite
to pray to God for divine blessings upon their country. From the earliest
days of our history, it has been a time-honored and cherished tradition
for our people to respond in prayer at the official request of government
authorities on solemn public occasions, in times of impending peril,
t Based upon an address delivered to jurists at the Red Mass celebrated in St.
Charles Borromeo Church, Brooklyn, New York, on September 20, 1962.
* The author is an associate professor of Political Philosophy and of Church-
State relations in American Public Law at Fordham University Graduate School.
A contributor to the Fordham Law Review, University of Detroit Law Journal,
Journal of Public Law, Humanitas, Civiltd Cattolica, New Scholasticism, Gior-
nale di Metafisica and the Cork University Press, he was American Specialist
lecturer for the Department of State in Europe during the summer of 1960.
1370 U.S. 421 (1962).
during war and in peace. Men, women and
children of different religious confessions
and church affiliations united by the com-
mon bond of belief in God have joined
their hearts and minds in a corporate act
of prayer for the preservation, survival and
prosperity of America. Civic corporate
prayer has been one of the most effective
unifying spiritual bonds in our national
history.
In the case before the high tribunal, no
one disputed that prayer was a religious
act. The Court admitted the absence of
regulatory compulsion and punitive coer-
cion. 2 The prayer in its simple wording was
2 Justice Douglas made these detailed admissions
in his concurring opinion: "First a word as to
what this case does not involve. Plainly, our
Bill of Rights would not permit a State or the
Federal Government to adopt an official prayer
and penalize anyone who would not utter it.
This, however, is not that case, for there is no
element of compulsion or coercion in New
York's regulation requiring that public schools
be opened each day with the . . .prayer ...
The prayer is said upon the commencement of
the school day, immediately following the Pledge
of Allegiance to the flag. The prayer is said
aloud in the presence of a teacher, who either
leads the recitation or selects a student to do
so. No student, however, is compelled to take
part. The respondents have adopted a regula-
tion which provides that 'neither teachers nor
any school authority shall comment on partici-
pation or non-participation . . . nor suggest
or request that any posture or language be used
or dress be worn or be not used or not worn.'
Provision is also made for excusing children,
upon written request of a parent or guardian,
from the saying of the prayer or from the room
in which the prayer is said. A letter implement-
ing and explaining this regulation has been sent
to each taxpayer and parent in the school dis-
trict. As I read this regulation, a child is free
to stand or not stand, to recite or not to recite,
without fear of reprisal or even comment by the
teacher or any other school official. In short,
the only one who need utter the prayer is the
teacher; and no teacher is complaining of it.
Students can stand mute or even leave the class-
room, if they desire."
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a solemn declaration of belief in the exist-
ence of Almighty God and a public ack-
nowledgement of our dependence upon God
as a nation as well as individually. There
was no intent or effect of "teaching" a new
belief in God.3 The prayer was an open
affirmation of a faith already possessed by
every participant. The approval of the par-
ents incontestably upholds this fact. The
prohibition against any comments on the
prayer was to ensure this fact. Voluntary
participation and liberty of exemption gave
the widest possible scope to personal re-
sponse of conscience.
An Establishment of Religion
The Supreme Court ruled that because
the prayer had been composed by a gov-
ernmental agency it fell under the ban of
the no establishment clause. Now this car-
dinal argument of the Court on govern-
mental composition may not really be as
telling as it seems. If by composition it is
understood that the prayer originated in
wording and meaning wholly with the New
York Board of Regents and entirely on
their own initiative then the argument is
without foundation. The New York educa-
tional authorities were motivated in part
by the broad public consensus authenti-
cally embodied in our national documents
on the religious foundations of our Repub-
lic and, in part, by the rights and anxieties
3 Mr. Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion,
stated: "In the present case, school facilities are
used to say the prayer and the teaching staff is
employed to lead the pupils in it. There is, how-
ever, no effort at indoctrination and no attempt
at exposition. Prayers of course may be so long
and of such a character as to amount to an
attempt at the religious instruction that was
denied by the McCollum case. But New York's
prayer is of a character that does not involve
any element of proselytizing as in the McCollun270
case."
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of religious-minded parents of students in
the public schools. They were guided in
the writing of the prayer in context and in
words by state constitutions, by congres-
sional resolutions and laws, by presidential
acts, and by practices in the judiciary. Fifty
state constitutions, in one way or another,
acknowledge their dependence upon Divine
Providence, express their gratitude to God
as the Author of our civil and religious
liberties, and pray for His continuing guid-
ance and counsel in their government de-
liberations. In addition to legislative and
military chapels and chaplaincies, acts of
the national Congress and other delibera-
tive assemblies have called for days of
prayer through executive proclamations.
The day after the national Congress passed
the proposal which became the first amend-
ment, it passed a resolution calling for the
designation of "a day of public thanksgiv-
ing and prayer." This tradition of civic cor-
porate prayer at the invitation of govern-
ment officials has been, with but two ex-
ceptions, unbroken from the days of George
Washington to the present administration.
More precisely to the issue at hand, the
Congress has officially prescribed and
adopted the divine invocation on our coin-
age and currency, in the national anthem
and motto, and in the Pledge of Allegiance
to the flag. What the New York Board of
Regents did was neither novel nor original.
Only in a minimal sense-almost only in
the capacity of an amanuensis-may it be
said to be their composition. They simply
gave expression to what the American peo-
ple and their duly elected representatives
have ratified and adopted in every decade
of our national history.4
4 While the majority opinion written by Mr.
Justice Black pivots the decision technically on
governmental composition of the prayer, con-
Some few reassuring voices insist that
the Court decision might not proscribe the
optional recitation of a prayer composed
by nonofficials. But the fact and the law are
that whatever takes place permissively in a
state school under official supervision or
conduct necessarily involves governmental
responsibility to some degree or another. It
is respectfully submitted that the high tri-
bunal over-exaggerated the significance of
the role of the New York Board of Re-
gents in the construction of the prayer
and foresaw potential dangers to Church
and State wholly out of proportion to its
real intent. It may be said that not every
and any government involvement in a reli-
gious act is eo ipso suspect and tainted with
unconstitutionality. One must look to the
context, purpose, and concrete circum-
strued as one of the exercises of a proscribed
state-established church under the ban of the
first amendment, Mr. Justice Douglas, on the
other hand, settles upon governmental financing
of religious exercises. Both the majority and
concurring opinions isolate elements of state-
church establishment, elements which by them-
selves are not necessarily derivative of nor con-
ducive to state-church establishment. Indeed a
governmental composition of a prayer-not any
prayer-and certain governmental financing of
religious exercises may be justifiably sustained
by the religious liberty clause. (In the instant
case, there was greater use of what was al-
ready financed. An additional specific expendi-
ture of public funds was not entailed by the
optional recitation of the New York prayer.)
In severing these elements from one another, the
way is paved for absolutizing an isolated ele-
ment into a constitutional barrier whether or
not anyone suffers an infringement of religious
liberty and without reg~ird to the equal protec-
tion which the law should extend to all, believer
and nonbeliever, consentient and dissident. Such
an absolutizing process gradually expands from
a narrow legalism to a broad premise of pro-
scription. Only recently, the New York Com-
missioner of Education ruled that a part of
The Star-Spangled Banner may not be used as
a school prayer. The radical source of the an-
stances of the religious act to ascertain its
constitutional propriety. One would sup-
pose that an officially prepared civic cor-
porate prayer, publicly known, approved
and consented to in advance, might have
been favorably viewed as a calculated pre-
caution to ensure the necessary constitu-
tional safeguards against any surprise en-
croachments upon a sectarian conscience by
the impromptu prayer of a well-meaning
student or teacher. Of two likely opposing
interpretations, the Court chose the nega-
tive one. The pivotal question may well
have turned on the rights of religious-
minded parents and school children to
choose freely to participate in an official
prayer modeled on our national documents,
in an educational program, to impress upon
the school children the moral and spiritual
tinomies which have been inserted by court in-
terpretation into the religious clauses of the first
amendment is the as yet unsettled legal ques-
tion (historically, there appears to be less doubt
about it) whether the two clauses, dealing with
no establishment and free exercise, are so cor-
respondent to one another that an adjudication
under one clause may not be at the expense
of the legal guarantees of the other, or whether
the two clauses may be interpreted in exclusive
isolation to one another. Until and unless this
question of the interrelationship of the two
clauses is resolved, the absolutist construction
of the no establishment clause which Mr. Justice
Rutledge put forth in his dissenting opinion in
Everson and which the Court adopted in Mc-
Colluin is likely to prevail over the original
authentic meaning of no establishment as ex-
plained by James Madison in his rejoinders to
questions put to him in the debates of Con-
gress. The danger involved in the absolutist in-
terpretation is that the judiciary may over-reach
itself by preempting the democratic political
process and embodying on its own initiative
public policy into constitutional law. In Zorach,
the possibilities of relating the two religious
clauses to one another harmoniously in specific
programs of mutual accommodation seemed an
implementation of Mr. Justice Black's assertion
in Everson about "the interrelationship of these
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values which have been recognized as the
basis of our free society.
Ancienit History and Modern Law
As if to give substance to its fears about
an official prayer, the Court reached back
to sixteenth-century England and the Com-
mon Prayer Book which the Established
Church imposed upon a nation. The em-
ployment of history in the determination
of cases should be subject to more rigorous
canons of constitutional relevance than was
exercised in the ruling on prayer. The
Common Prayer Book and its succeeding
amended versions was composed by the
Established Church of England with the
deliberate intent of effectuating revolution-
ary doctrinal changes-at first upon those
unsuspecting faithful who still clung to
complementary clauses" and his warning against
interjecting a religious discriminatory norm into
the first amendment.
Another source of ambiguity is the fear of
the extent to which government aid to religion
may go. To date, the Court has not yet formu-
lated practical norms beyond which the political
process may not extend. The wide variety of
legislative precedents from the beginning of the
Republic to this day of governmental financing
of religious life directly, indirectly, and inci-
dently offers the greatest obstacles to the judi-
cial construction of such norms. Perhaps in the
last resort, public opinion may provide the prac-
tical wisdom to which intercredal dialogues
hope to make sensible contributions. Some con-
stitutional lawyers have opposed a "neutral prin-
ciple" to the principle of neutrality in the area
of federal aid to education. This neutral prin-
ciple looks to the standard of public function
and will not allow religion to be the cause for
action or inaction because the religious clauses
of the first amendment prohibit classification
that would entail conferment of a benefit or
the imposition of a burden. Under this neu-
tral principle, the prayer case might have turned
on the question whether civic corporate prayer
was indeed a constitutionally justifiable exer-
cise for the promotion of an educational pro-
gram to foster in school children moral and
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articles of faith according to papal teach-
ing after the breach with Rome, and in the
following century, upon alert and vigor-
ously resisting Puritans. It was deliberately
designed not only to change ancient cere-
monial administration of the sacraments,
but its wording was calculated to instill in
the people the new theological doctrines of
the Episcopal Church touching upon the
meaning, substance, and validity of the
sacramental rites. The Common Prayer
Book was an instrument of radical credal
changes prescribed for the willing and the
unwilling, for the knowledgeable and the
unknowing, and the English government
was a party to this.5
The New York prayer was not a surprise
encroachment upon sectarian confessions;
it conformed with beliefs already held, it
was imposed on no one, it was recom-
mended to all, it was freely adopted by the
local school board, and in the instant case,
voluntarily participated in by all school
children with the approval of their parents,
with but one exemption-the highest de-
gree of near unanimity possible.
The constitutional relevance of sixteenth-
and seventeenth-century English history was
without any substantive analogy to the New
York case. The resort to the historical past
does not enlighten if it serves to evoke
ancient fears and premonitions out of tune
with our times and our sensibilities. Amer-
icans have a right to fashion their own
spiritual values which have been traditionally
part of our national heritage. The determina-
tion of this precise issue would in turn rest on
the ulterior question whether it is part of the
public function of tax-supported schools to trans-
mit the spiritual heritage of the nation as it is
authentically embodied in the official acts and
the authoritative documents of American his-
tory.
52 HUGHES, THE REFORMATION IN ENGLAND
111-13, 121-26 (1954).
constitutional history in church-state rela-
tions without being burdened by the mem-
ories of religious wars and animosities of
their distant forebears.
Perhaps in an effort to bolster the weak-
ness of the historical analogy, the Court
sought to bridge the span of centuries and
the disparity of national experiences by the
use of a "bad tendency" rule together with
an agreement based on indirect coercive
pressure. The majority opinion said that "a
union of government and religion tends to
destroy government and to degrade reli-
gion." To which we would add that when
government encourages religious life as part
of its spiritual heritage, it strengthens it-
self and enhances religious liberty. And
both the dark and bright lessons of history
will illustrate that the governments which
show impartial accommodations for the
exercise of religious liberty to all are the
wonder of mankind and the hope of all
churches. As for the indirect coercive pres-
sure, it is no more-perhaps even less-
than what might be inferred from voluntary
salute to the flag with or without the divine
reference, in the singing of the national an-
them and in the program of released time
for religious instruction.
It is no small cause for wonder that in
all of the first amendment cases touching
upon education and religion, at no time
does the Court, in resorting to Jefferson,
ever consider Jefferson's own plans for
lower and higher education which he drew
up for his own state of Virginia upon his
retirement from the presidency. His educa-
tional plans of 18146, 18177, 18188, 18221,
G JEFFERSON, Plan for An Educational System,
in THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 1064-69 (Pad-
over ed. 1943) [hereinafter cited as PADOVER].
7 JEFFERSON, An Act for Establishing Ele-
mentary Schools, in PADOVER 1072, 1076.
and 182410 disclose three principles to be
permanent in Jefferson's mind. First, that a
totally non-religious education is defective.
Secondly, government is to offer impartial
encouragement and, if need be, accommoda-
tions to expressions of religious life in state
schools. Thirdly, in the manner of mutual
accommodation and cooperative relation-
ship, neither government nor religion is to
lose any measure of its proper competence
and independent jurisdiction. Jefferson never
construed such cordial arrangements and
mutual adjustments as tantamount to a
union of Church and State which tends to
destroy the one and degrade the other. If
the high tribunal was in search of Jeffer-
son's mind on a practice that bore some
substantial constitutional analogy to the
New York prayer it might have examined
his draft for the establishment of state ele-
mentary schools which the Virginia As-
sembly enacted into law in 1817. In the
eleventh provision of the act we read:
The said teachers shall, in all things relating
to education and government of their pu-
pils, be under the direction and control of
the visitors; but no religious reading, in-
struction or exercise shall be prescribed or
practiced inconsistent with the tenets of any
religious sect or denomination.
For Jefferson there was only one absolute
and all controlling restriction on afiy re-
ligious exercise or instruction in the ele-
mentary grades; that it be not inconsistent
with the confessional tenets of the school
children. He was most anxious to guard the
religious conscience of all minors against
the more learned persuasion of adult in-
8 JEFFERSON, The University of Virginia, Aim
and Curriculum, in PADOVER 1097, 1104.
9 JEFFERSON, Freedom of Religion at the Uni-
versity of Virginia, in PADOVER 957-58.
10 JEFFERSON, Regulations for the University,
in PADOVER 1106-11.
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structors. All of his educational plans insist
upon a positive doctrine of impartial and
mutually beneficent accommodation be-
tween the religious conscience and the state
schools. The New York prayer gave of-
fense to no denominational confession. On
the contrary, it was willingly recited pre-
cisely because it was in full accord with
professed beliefs. We do not say that
Thomas Jefferson should be considered the
constitutional oracle of government rela-
tions with religion in education. But if the
Supreme Court chooses to quote him, it
ought to have recourse to the very docu-
ments that give his own explicit direct and
pertinent testimony. Whether the Court
might then be still willing to follow him
remains at this time an open question.
One of the most engaging enterprises of
the high tribunal is the frequency with
which it employs James Madison's justly
famed Memorial and Remonstrance Against
Religious Assessments of 1785 and the
ease with which its meaning is bent beyond
its authentic purpose. In 1784, Patrick
Henry proposed to the Virginia Assembly
a "Bill Establishing a Provision for Teach-
ers of the Christian Religion" with the ex-
pectation that such a comprehensive tax
support would find acceptance with all
Christians to take place of the abrogated
provision for the support of the Anglican
ministers alone. It was against this prefer-
ence through tax support of a religion, a
broadly defined christianity under the be-
nign mantle of the Anglican Establishment,
that Madison directed his famed Memorial.
Who does not see that the same authority
which can establish Christianity, in exclu-
sion of all other Religions, may establish
with the same ease any particular sect of
Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects?
That the same authority which can force a
citizen to contribute three pence only of
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his property for the support of any one
establishment, may force him to conform
to any other establishment in all cases
whatsoever. 1
The New York prayer was singularly free
of any of these Madisonian premonitions.
It allowed Christians of every denomina-
tion and non-Christians of any confession
to join in a unifying corporate prayer
wholly of their own choice and in accord
with their own religious conscience. Fifty
signers of the Declaration of Independence
-34 Episcopalians, 13 Congregationalists,
6 Presbyterians, 1 Baptist, 1 Quaker, and 1
Catholic---confessed publicly to self-evident
truths in the common patrimony of human
nature which the Creator had endowed
with certain inalienable rights. And Paul of
Tarsus, Jewish Apostle of Christianity
among the Gentiles, taught that knowledge
of God is open to human reason apart from
the teachings of divine revelation.
As for the Court's reference to James
Madison, one may note that, apart from
its misleading use of his Memorial, it
scarcely takes any cognizance of Madison's
own unequivocal explanation of the scope
and meaning of the no establishment clause
recorded in the congressional debates. 12
And further, it takes no note of the sig-
nificant fact that ex-President Madison was
one of the Commissioners for the Univer-
sity of Virginia for whom Jefferson drafted
the educational plan of 1818 for submission
to the legislature of the state, which de-
clares that:
[rihe proofs of .... God, the creator, pre-
server, and supreme ruler of the universe,
the author of all the relations of morality,
and of the laws and obligations these infer,
11 2 TIE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 184-88
(Hunt ed. 1901). (Emphasis added.)
12 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 727 (1789).
will be within the province of the professor
of ethics; to which adding the developments
of these moral obligations, of those in
which all sects agree, with a knowledge of
the languages, Hebrew, Greek, and Latin,
a basis will be formed common to all sects.
Psychology and Law
The establishment clause, the Supreme
Court said, does "not depend upon any
showing of direct governmental compulsion
and is violated by the enactment of laws
which establish an official religion whether
the laws operate directly to coerce the non-
observing or not." It may be that the Court
was simply saying that, as in England to-
day, direct governmental compulsion need
not be a necessary incidence of proscribed
establishment even though it almost always
entails at least indirect coercive pressure.
In a word, the Court ruled the element of
compulsion to be constitutionally non-rele-
vant and not as controlling as it had held
in the McCollum and Zorach cases.
Indirect coercive pressure upon the re-
ligious nonconformist is everywhere in the
air we breathe, apart from those circum-
stances where there is governmental pro-
vision for religious expression in public in-
stitutions. It takes its strongest emotional
experience in a constraining feeling of
embarrassment. This is generally the con-
comitant of most acts of dissent and non-
conformity. Public law is committed to the
defense of individual rights, to the remedy
and redress of hurt rights, not hurt feelings
unless the hurt is such that it effectively
impedes the free exercise of personal choice.
Public law is not required to convert the
psychology of dissent into a constitutional
principle. It is not the function of law to
remove the situations wherein contrary
choices may engender contrary feelings.
The dissenter must be the first to acknowl-
edge that the condition for his own dissent
is to live and let live. Good will in a com-
munity rests in great measure on people
leaving others to their own choices. No man
is an island to himself in society. Robinson
Crusoe was seemingly free from any social
inhibitions until one day he noticed the
footprints of another and from that mo-
ment on, the law of mutual adjustment and
tolerance set in. The right of the conscien-
tious objector is to shield his own con-
science, not to strike down the religious
rights of his neighbors. We are all consci-
entious objectors and none of us should
enjoy an exclusive privilege to the preju-
dice of others. 13
If words have substantive meaning, a
"captive audience" is an audience whose
involuntary presence is forcibly detained or
whose involuntary participation is com-
pelled. To have denied the school children
the choice of joining in the recitation of the
prayer was to deny them the opportunity
of sharing in the spiritual heritage of our
nation. The governmental denial of free-
dom of choice is as much coercion as the
13 Jewish Orthodox want an exception for their
ritual slaughter of animals in humane slaughter
laws. Jehovah's Witnesses are exempt from the
salute to the flag. Pacifists object to combatant
and noncombatant military service. Christian
Scientists are excused from hygiene courses. One
atheist child wiped out a voluntary cooperative
arrangement of five years standing by eight
hundred Protestants, about twenty Catholics, and
thirty Jews for religious instruction in public
schools. Sabbatarians oppose Sunday Laws.
Catholics oppose the use of public funds for the
promotion of birth control instructions at home
and in any foreign aid program. The Amish
raise religious objections to the Social Security
tax. These are but a handful of the instances
of legally and politically effective protests. Is
there any room for conscientious protest against
godless education in public schools? Would
Thomas Jefferson's protest be heeded today?
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imposing of an action. The argument that
public law is required to ensure the con-
scientious dissenter impervious to indirect
coercive pressure, divisiveness, and the
likelihood of social stigma and isolation
that may possibly follow upon a govern-
mental program of religious accommoda-
tion, bears within itself a premise of
assault upon the salute to the flag in our
public schools to which the Jehovah Wit-
nesses oppose their religious conscience.
We have travelled a full and truly vicious
circle. From religious persecution, intol-
erance and church establishment to benign
tolerance-to disestablishment-to equality
of all faiths before the law-to equality of
belief and nonbelief before the law-and
now to the secularist and the religious dis-
senter's intolerance of religious belief in
public law. The wry irony is that this is
being done, we are told, in the name of and
for the sake of religious liberty.
We are losing by default. We have taken
our spiritual heritage for granted. We have
allowed a creeping gradualism of secular-
ism under one specious pretext after an-
other to take over our public schools. A
vociferous and highly organized pressure
group is exerting its own form of indirect
coercive pressure upon the American com-
munity. Determined to deflect our national
traditions and heritage from their authentic
historic course, it is cutting a devisive swath
across the nation, advertising for clients to
challenge in court what is obnoxious to
them. Whoever works for the destruction
of the positive doctrine of accommodation
and mutual adjustment must shoulder the
blame for uprooting the bonds of concord
and friendship and forcibly injecting bitter
antagonisms in our pluralistic society. Po-
litical and legal action alone cannot create
the moral and social impulses which are the
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conditions of harmony in a community.
With full regard for the radical and pri-
mary rights of all parents to guide the edu-
cation of their children in public schools,
as well as in independent private schools,
members of a local community can strive
with persevering good will to find a reason-
able accommodation and mutual adjust-
ment of one another's choices. In this way
law becomes-as it ought-the formal ex-
pression of the practical wisdom of a self-
regulating community. Dissidents and con-
sentients should be motivated to the
exercise of cultivated rights of men living
in fellowship and not as strangers in a con-
test of absolute and conflicting claims.
The more we examine the context of the
New York prayer and the circumstances
attending its optional recitation, the more
we discern the vast possibilities it offered
for the increase of friendly community life.
First, the children and their approving
parents of different faiths and church affili-
ations came together in a prayer based on
the common bonds of their religious beliefs.
Their religious sectarianism was in no way
experienced as a barrier to the brotherhood
of all men under the Fatherhood of God.
One would suppose that with all the adult
incantations about the intercredal relations
and the counsels-on all sides--of charity
and good-will against divisiveness, here in-
deed was a truly unitive bond of intercredal
relations in the most sensitive time of the
school children's formative years.
Second, it provided an opportune and
excellent educational training and habitu-
ation to the exercise of individual choice in
the midst of others according to the
vaunted American boast of individualism
and free self-expression. Religious differ-
ences are a very broad fact even for the
most enlightened adults, and social adjust-
ment in this matter is essential to good
community relations. Should not the
youngsters mature gradually in this deli-
cate experience with civility toward one
another without resentment and without
inhibition? The circumstances for the cor-
porate prayer provided an early schooling
both for the dissidents and the consentients
to advance in mutual reverence for one
another's religious choices.
Third, the dissenter and the minority
must surely be shielded from majoritarian
imposition. So too must the majority be
protected from the unilateral dictation of
the absolute dissenter. It is indeed a strange
pathology of our time that when people in
increasing numbers freely choose to act
agreeably in unison there is less cause for
public gratification than in the uncompro-
mising protestations of the dissenter. The
numerical superiority of a consensual
agreement should not be constitutionally
suspect, and if conformity is the flower of
human freedom, the wider the area of re-
ligious consensus among the variety of re-
ligious confessions, the greater will be the
harmony among men of good will. Only
when the dissenter treasures the liberties
of others as his own and insists on equal
freedom and the same legal immunity for
opposing choices that he demands for him-
self, then will we be sure that he acts in
the name of law and justice.
No one can deny that public law is
burdened with an almost insurmountable
task when it is confronted with the prob-
lems of religious pluralism. We are of the
opinion that the voluntary nondenomina-
tional prayer was possibly one of the best,
and at that, a minimal resolution of this
thorny moral-legal problem.
Separation and Relation
Separation of Church and State in Amer-
ican law is uniquely an American experi-
ence. Its meaning derives from our own
constitutional history from the days of the
Northwest Ordinance to the recent con-
struction of the chapel at the Air Force
Academy in Colorado. Our separation of
Church and State is a positive affirmation,
not a negative protestation. Its paramount
purpose is to preserve unimpaired and in-
violable the freedom and independence of
both Church and State. It is but the
counterpart of an orderly and harmonious
relationship of friendly powers, a relation-
ship of cordial cooperation and of benevo-
lent accommodation, not a relationship of
mutually exclusive isolation. In Everson14
the Court held for benevolent impartiality
for believers and unbelievers equally alike.
In Zorach-5 a positive doctrine of accom-
14 "New Jersey cannot consistently with the 'es-
tablishment of religion' clause of the First
Amendment contribute tax-raised funds to the
support of an institution which teaches the
tenets and faith of any church. On the other
hand, other language of the amendment com-
mands that New Jersey cannot hamper its citi-
zens in the free exercise of their own religion.
Consequently, it cannot exclude individual
Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists,
Jews, Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians,
or the members of any other faith, because of
their faith or lack of it, from receiving the
benefits of public welfare legislation. While we
do not mean to intimate that a state could
not provide transportation only to children at-
tending public schools, we must be careful, in
protecting the citizens of New Jersey against
state-established churches, to be sure that we
do not inadvertently prohibit New Jersey from
extending its general state law benefits to all its
citizens without regard to their religious be-
liefs." Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S.
1, 16 (1947). (Emphasis added.)
15 "We are a religious people whose institutions
presuppose a Supreme Being. We guarantee the
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modation was opposed to a neutrality of
total abstention, of indifference, suspicion
and hostility. The New York prayer was
indeed a reasonable and proper accommo-
dation to the spiritual needs of our people
in accordance with the spiritual heritage of
freedom to worship as one chooses. We make
room for as wide a variety of beliefs and creeds
as the spiritual needs of man deem necessary.
We sponsor an attitude on the part of the gov-
ernment that shows no partiality to any one
group and that lets each flourish according to
the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its
dogma. When the state encourages religious in-
struction or cooperates with religious authori-
ties by adjusting the schedule of public events
to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our tra-
ditions. For it then respects the religious na-
ture of our people and accommodates the public
service to their spiritual needs. To hold that it
may not would be to find in the Constitution a
requirement that the government show a cal-
lous indifference to religious groups. That would
be preferring those who believe in no religion
over those who do believe." Zorach v. Clauson,
343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952). (Emphasis added.)
In the Zorach opinion which Mr. Justice
Douglas wrote, he listed, with apparent approval
and as giving substance to his argument, sev-
eral tax-supported religious exercises by public
officials and in public institutions: "Prayers in
our legislative halls; the appeals to the Al-
mighty in the messages of the Chief Executive;
the proclamations making Thanksgiving Day a
holiday; 'so help me God' in our courtroom
oaths-these and other references to the Al-
mighty that run through our laws, our public
rituals, our ceremonies, would be flouting the
First Amendment. A fastidious atheist or ag-
nostic could even object to the supplication with
which the Court opens each session: 'God save
the United States and this Honorable Court.' "
In Engel v. Vitale, Justice Douglas has forgot-
ten the fastidious objector and attached him-
self to an absolutizing principle of government
financing of religious activity (and every gov-
ernmental action is tax-supported) that would
abrogate the multitude of governmental involve-
ments in religious exercises which he had cited
with approval in Zorach. Now, apparently, a
taxpayer may have stronger claims before Jus-
tice Douglas as a fastidious financier than as a
fastidious conscientious objector.
PRAYER IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
our country. What absolute right has a
dissenter to protest against such an orderly
harmony when the government acts to
foster the relevance of religion to our na-
tional existence according to the cherished
traditions of our country? To what purpose
then may a court reason, "If this is allowed
to take place, dire consequences will there-
fore inevitably follow." Politics, social rela-
tions, and public law cannot be regulated
solely by narrow legal ergotisms. Each
human experience is invested with sensibili-
ties of its own times and the present may
presage a future wholly alien to the heavy
hand of the past. The law of progress is
applicable to public law as to other human
enterprises. Far from being a dark begin-
ning, a first experiment on our liberties, a
portent of dangers to come, the New York
prayer was, on the contrary, a refined prod-
uct of American constitutional history on
Church-State relations, sensitive to the
rights of conscience of all-of parents and
their children, of participants and nonpar-
ticipants, of equal neutrality between be-
liever and nonbeliever, of impartiality
among all the religious confessions, with
due regard to the government's role to
foster in public schools the relevance of
belief in God to our national existence-
and all above with immunity for personal
choice.
Every generation of Americans has ad-
mitted to the role of the government in
attesting to the religious foundations of our
republic and official composition or adop-
tion of divine invocations has been one of
the traditional government practices in a
great variety of government-supported re-
ligious exercises: the Presidential procla-
mations of days of prayer and thanksgiving,
the prayerful invocation in fifty state consti-
tutions, the prayer which opens each day's
session of the Supreme Court, the religiou
inscription on our coinage and currency,"
16 Occasionally one hears and reads of stntu
ments (recently, by Rev. Dean Kelley of tir,'_
Department of Religious Liberty, Council of the
Churches of Christ) that religious inscriptions
on coins and currency are a profane use of C -
vine invocations. Really, no one may a.e.ic
conclusively that there must be religious
scriptions on our coinage. But given the ja-.
by congressional enactment, one may qucsL:C,'
the charge of impropriety of the employmr1t
of divine references on our currency. Radicall,'
it is a question of asceticism. Optimistic aszcL-
cism affirms that the original goodness o. C-
vine creation forever retains the image of gvL:-
liness against any evil doing. All things re!m;0u
sacred and for this reason St. Paul wrote th ,t
all creation calls out "Abba Pater" and our Fl-
vine Lord said that the stones would cry ouL .1
His praise if the jubilant shouts of the cl it-
dren had been stifled. Through the centur,,
men have quarried stones and marble to raise
magnificent houses of worship. Most of .
tangible articles used in divine services arc c;
gold, silver and the finest raiment. There is tcj
a somber asceticism once prevalent among th:e
English and American Puritans which saw t. c
danger of distraction or interference in t..,
instrumentalities to the direct communica:i.
of the human heart with God. This view, how-
ever, is not relevant to the issue. The charge ol
profane use rests logically upon a presupposi-
tion of Manichaeism which considers corporeal
and material things as somehow vitiated, taintL:1,
and imbued with a radical principle for evil in
eternal contest with the spiritual principle of
Goodness for the allegiance of men. In t.11
view, material things in no way can give glory
to God. Optimistic asceticism affirms, on t:1-
contrary, that the source of evil does not spring
from things-falsitas non ex rebus sed ex p',c-
catis (St. Augustine) but from a love that i;
not God-centered-nonfaciunt bonos vel malos
mores nisi boni vel mali amores (St. Augus-
tine). Now, optimistic asceticism does not de-
mand nor require that there be divine invoca-
tions on currencies. But it does deny that such
inscriptions on coinage are a profane use. The
are in accord with the dominical prayer for
daily bread and may serve as a telling reminder
that commercial instruments of exchange are
not to be debauched by dishonest trafficking
Also, religious-minded citizens may wish divine
in our national anthem and motto, and in
the salute to the flag-not to mention the
public financing of legislative and military
chapels and chaplaincies by the state and
national governments. Now if federal and
state government officials and public insti-
tutions may engage in religious activity
why should the first amendment operate to
greater duress upon a local school board
and the school children who wish to say a
prayer together? The New York prayer
was no more a violation of the no establish-
ment clause in public school activities than
the optional participation in the singing of
the national anthem, the Pledge of Alle-
giance, the released time religious instruc-
tion program, and in court proceedings, the
statutory alternate of testifying under oath
or by affirmation. In Zorach, we were told
that the "problem, like many problems on
constitutional law, is one of degree." But
in the prayer case, the Court perceived an
absolutizing principle which posed a threat
to government and religion.
One Nation Under God
It is not in any way intimated that a
civic corporate prayer so much in evidence
in our public institutions and in our na-
tional documents would, if excluded from
our public schools, bear within itself a
"bad tendency" rule that might inexorably
work to the development of a godless state
in America. But in our times we have seen
a highly civilized society whose government
gradually restricted in their civil institutions
the official profession of belief and depend-
blessing and providence for our national econ-
omy.
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ence upon God and withdrew religious ex-
ercises exclusively to churches and homes.
But when the tragic hour of conflicting al-
legiances bore upon its citizens, they
obeyed with passioned submission and
gratified acquiescence a supreme and abso-
lute statal authority to the complete de-
struction of the state and to the enduring
shame of their religious confessions. Per-
haps the United States Supreme Court
might have allowed a "good tendency" rule
to be immanent in the civic corporate
prayer to impress on all alike-on the par-
ticipants and the nonparticipants-that
there is a higher allegiance to God under
which men must rule, that no patriotism
may obey against the moral law, that per-
sonal immunity against arbitrary power is
a divine mandate. It is not without pro-
found symbolism that public authority
should be a party to an acknowledgement
of dependence upon God.
Thomas Jefferson once wrote:
Can the liberties of a nation be thought se-
cure, when we have removed their own
firm basis, a conviction in the minds of the
people that these liberties are the gifts of
God?17
Public schools should share in the task of
transmitting to our school children the rele-
vance of a free order among men to the
Divine Author of all liberties and accord-
ingly allow this conviction to abide and
deepen among the rising generation of
Americans.
17 Quoted by MORRIS, CHRISTIAN LIFE AND
CHARACTER OF THE CIVIL INSTITUTIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES DEVELOPED IN THE OFFICIAL
AND HISTORICAL ANNALS OF THE UNITED .STATES
35 (1864).
